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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV—88-87

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

JAMES E. TIERNEY,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, by and
through the Consumer and
and Antitrust Division,

)
)
)
)

)
Plaintiff

)
)
)

v.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JAMES E. TIERNEY,
ATTORNEY GENERAL

)
JOSEPH A. EDWARDS,
SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE,
Department of Professional
and Financial Regulation,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, James E. Tierney, Attorney General, brings
this appeal pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 80C to challenge the
Decisions and Orders issued by Joseph A. Edwards,
Superintendent of Insurance (hereinafter referred to as
"Superintendent"), in connection with a hearing to determine
whether a requested rate increase by Associated Hospital
Service of Maine (hereinafter referred to as "AHS") for
non-group or individual subscribers was excessive, inadequate
or unfairly discriminatory.

Specifically, the Attorney

General asserts that the Superintendent erred in permitting
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AHS to apply its state tax exemption across all of its lines
of business rather than to those lines (including the
non-group line) which provide coverage to high risk and
economically vulnerable subscribers.

As will be set forth in

detail in this Brief, the Superintendent committed errors of
law by assigning the burden of proof to the Attorney General
rather than to AHS and by applying a standard of proof
significantly in excess of the legally applicable standard of
proof —

proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

If the Superintendent had properly assigned the burden of
proof to AHS and if the Superintendent had applied the correct
standard of proof then the Attorney General would have
prevailed below.

As will be discussed subsequently, the

evidence submitted by the Attorney General with respect to the
tax exemption issue was unchallenged by AHS.

Accordingly, the

Attorney General requests that this Court reverse the
Decisions and Orders of the Superintendent and order the
Superintendent to require AHS to apply its tax exemption only
to those lines of insurance which provide coverage to high
risk subscribers, namely, non-group coverage and Medicare
supplemental coverage.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
I . PROCEDURAL HISTORY PRIOR TO THE SUPERINTENDENT'S DECISIONS
AND ORDERS
On November 23, 1987, AHS submitted a filing to the
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Superintendent requesting an increase in rates for Blue Cross
and Blue Shield non-group or individual coverage.

The

requested rate increase averaged 27.7%.
On December 22, 1987, the Superintendent issued a Notice of
Public Hearing pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A. § 2322 to review AHS's
request for a rate increase.

In his Notice of Public Hearing

the Superintendent identified two issues which would be given
specific consideration at the hearing:

a.
Should savings from hospital discounts
provided under section 3 of Rule Chapter 363
promulgated by the Maine Health Care Finance
Commission be allocated entirely to the
non-group line of business rather than being
spread across all lines?
b.
Is the current Blue Cross certificate,
which places a variable inside limit on the
daily room and board benefit, appropriate in
light of current patterns of hospital
charges?
December 22, 1987 Notice of Public Hearing.

The Notice

indicated that the hearing would be held on January 12, 1988 in
Augusta and that any intervenor should file an application by
January 8, 1988.
On January 8, 1988, the Department of the Attorney General
filed an application to intervene pursuant both to 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 9054(1) (which provides that state agencies may, as a matter
of right, intervene in administrative hearings) and the
Attorney General's common law powers.

In his Petition, the
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Attorney General indicated that he would assist the
Superintendent in probing the issues set forth in the Notice of
Public Hearing as well as the following additional issue:

How has Blue Cross and Blue Shield used the
benefits provided by tax exemption under
state law and should those benefits be
allocated entirely to the non-group line of
business rather than being spread across all
1ines?
January 8, 1988 Application for Intervention.

The Attorney

General also filed a Motion to Continue the hearing scheduled
for January 12, 1988.
Additionally, on January 8, 1988, John L. Martin filed a
Petition to Intervene, raising three additional issues which he
sought to be addressed at the hearing.

Mr. Martin also filed a

Motion to Continue.
On January 12, 1988, the Superintendent granted the
application of the Attorney General to intervene pursuant to
5 M.R.S.A. § 9054.

The Superintendent also allowed the issue

raised by the Department of the Attorney General concerning
AHS's use of its tax exemptions to be considered at the
hearing.

The Superintendent granted John L. Martin's

Application to Intervene.

However, the Superintendent

disallowed consideration of the three issues raised in Mr.
Martin's Application for Intervention,

Finally, the
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Superintendent continued the hearing until January 22, 1988, in
Augusta.

The hearing began and was concluded on that date.

At the hearing on January 22, 1988, AHS presented five
witnesses, all of whom were examined by one or both of the
intervenors,

In addition, AHS submitted the written testimony

of a sixth witness and .submitted nine exhibits.

The Attorney

General presented the testimony of one witness, Francis G.
McGinty, Executive Director of the Maine Health Care Finance
Commission, and submitted four exhibits.

John L. Martin

submitted two exhibits.
II. DECISIONS AND ORDERS
A.

Decision and Order of January 27, 1988.

On January 27, 1988, the Superintendent issued his Decision
and Order disapproving the proposed rate increase.!/

The

Superintendent addressed three issues in his Decision and
Order:

first, whether AHS's requested increase was excessive

because of the failure to properly allocate the differential
granted by the Maine Health Care Commission; second, whether
the requested rate increase was excessive because of the
failure of AHS to properly allocate the benefits from its tax

i/Also on that same date the Superintendent issued a second
Decision and Order approving a new filing by AHS. AHS's new
filing contained a requested rate increase of 21.7%.
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exemptions; and third, whether the non-group policies offered
by AHS provide a sufficient array of coverages.
1.

Allocation of the Maine Health Care Finance
Commission differential for non-group coverage.

The Maine Health Care Finance Commission (hereinafter
referred to as "MHCFC"), pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 396-G(2)(A)
(Supp. 1987), is authorized to establish differentials or
discounts for payors (such as AHS) which establish that they
engage in practices "resultting] in quantifiable savings to the
hospitals or reduction in payments of other payors."
22 M.R.S.A. § 396-G(2)(A) (Supp. 1987).

Any payor receiving a

discount is permitted to reduce its payment to hospitals by the
amount of the discount.

The purpose of the provision on

differentials is clearly set forth in the Act's Findings and
Declaration of Purpose:

to establish equity between payors.

22 M.R.S.A. § 381(2)(A)(5) (Supp. 1987).

Through Rules

promulgated in April, 1985, the MHCFC established several
criteria which would justify a payor in obtaining a discount;
one such criteria is the provision of non-group or individual
coverage.

MHCFC Rule Chapter 363, § 3.

On September 15, 1987,

the MHCFC issued an order providing AHS with a discount or
differential of 1.09% in recognition of AHS's provision of
non-group or individual coverage.

The effect of this discount

was to permit AHS to reduce its payments to hospitals 1.09%
below the amount actually charged by hospitals.
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The Superintendent found that AHS allocated the benefits
from this differential "equally [to] all of AHS‘s lines of
business."

The Superintendent further found that the 1.09%

differential resulted "from AHS1s offering of . . . non-group;
contracts" and, consequently, the benefit of that differential
should be provided to non-group subscribers.

Specifically, the

Superintendent ordered that at least 75% of the savings
resulting from the provision of the discount for non-group
coverage be provided to non-group subscribers.

The remaining

25% could be allocated across all lines of business in
recognition of "the added financial security of the non-group
line resulting from the existence of the larger reserves of the
group line of business."
2.

Allocation of benefits from the premium tax
exemption.

Pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 2513 (Supp, 1987), insurance
companies are taxed annually "for the privilege of doing
business in this State" at a rate of 2% of all premiums
received.

Nonprofit hospital and medical service plans, such

as AHS, however, are exempt from state taxation, including
taxation under the insurance premium tax.
(1974),

24 M.R.S.A, § 2311

AHS, which in 1977 received premiums totaling $270

million, therefore, is exempt from paying the 2% or $5.4
million premium tax.

T. 92.
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AHS allocates the benefit from the premium tax exemption
across al of its lines of business:

group coverage, Medicare

complimentary coverage, as well as non-group coverage.

At the

hearing, the Attorney General presented evidence that the
purpose of AHS's tax exemption was to permit AHS to provide
coverage to high risk groups:

non-group subscribers and

Medicare Companion Plan subscribers.!/

Consequently, the

^/Through the testimony of Wayne Webster, Vice President for
Finance at AHS, the Attorney General introduced Attorney
General Exhibit No. 1, the testimony of Bernard Tresnowski,
President of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, before
the United States Senate Finance Committee on February 4,
1986. T. 97-8. Mr. Webster stated that Attorney General
Exhibit No. 1 constitutes the formal testimony of the Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Association on the issue of whether Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Plans should be provided a federal income
tax exemption. Mr. Webster stated that the reasons or
justifications for the federal tax exemption for Blue Cross and
Blue Shield are the same as the justification for the state tax
exemption. T. 97.
Mr. Tresnowski, in his testimony to the Senate Finance
Committee, clearly stated the underlying rationale for tax
exemptions for Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.
What is very important to remember is the
basic purpose of the tax exemption:
it is,
after all, intended to reduce burdens on
government. Blue Cross and Blue Shield have
been fulfilling that role for 50 years.
If
the plans are unable to continue their
community function of covering the highest
risk, the government would have no choice
but to step in.
Attorney General Exhibit No. 1 at 24. Eralier in his
testimony, Mr. Tresnowski again commented on the reason for the
tax exemption provided to Blue Cross and Blue Shield:
These community-based Plans continue to earn
that tax exemption every day by providing
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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Attorney General argued at the hearing that the premium tax
exemption should benefit those high risk subscribers who have
difficulty obtaining subscribers who have difficulty obtaining
insurance from any one other than AHS and should not benefit
those group subscribers who can obtain insurance from the many
companies who are active in the highly competitive market for
group coverage.
In his January 27th Decision and order, the Superintendent
refused to rule on the appropriateness of AHS's allocation of
the premium tax exemption across all of its lines of business
because it found that the Attorney General had provided "no
quantification of preferential tax benefits that would make
possible an equitable allocation of such benefits.1'
3.

Rate design.

On the rate design issue, the Superintendent ordered "AHS
to study the need for changes in the non-group product line and
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
comprehensive, affordable health care on a
non-profit basis to the most vulnerable of
our citizens — the sick, the elderly,
members of small employer groups and
individuals who have no group affiliation.
Attorney General Exhibit No. 1 at 1 (emphasis added).
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report its findings .

. b y June 1, 1988."

The rate design

issue is not a subject of this appeal and, accordingly, will
not be discussed further.
B.

Decision and Order of February 25, 1983.

On February 16, 1988, the Attorney General petitioned the
Superintendent to reopen the hearing for the purpose of
changing or modifying his January 27th Decision and Order.
Specifically, the Attorney General sought to have the
Superintendent clarify what additional quantifications of the
premium tax exemption were needed; to permit the parties to
make the appropriate additional quantifications; and to reach a
determination as to what constituted an "equitable allocation
of" benefits from the premium tax exemption.

The Attorney

General raised two other issues in his motion, neither of which
are relevant on this appeal,
On February 25, 1988, the Superintendent issued a Decision
and Order denying the Attorney General's Motion.

In his

Decision and Order the Superintendent reached three conclusions
concerning the tax exemption issue:
1.

The Attorney General had failed to present

"unequivocal evidence" (emphasis added) indicating that the
non-group line was "the raison d e 1etre" for the premium tax
exemption;
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2.

The Attorney General had failed to present "convincing

evidence" (emphasis added) justifying his proposed order for
allocating of the benefit from the premium tax exemption; and
3.

The Attorney General had failed to "carry its burden"

(emphasis added) on the tax exemption issue.
III.

APPEAL TO LAW COURT
After the Attorney General filed his Rule 80C appeal, the

Superintendent moved to dismiss and filed a separate action
seeking a mandamus requiring the Attorney General to represent
the Superintendent in the appeal in Brown v. Superintendent.
The Superior Court dismissed this appeal and granted the
requested mandamus.

On May 17, 1989, the Law Court reversed

the Superior Court and reinstated this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
In his February 25, 1988 Order, the Superintendent made two
significant errors of law.

First, the Superintendent assigned

the Attorney General the burden of proof on the issue of the
appropriate allocation of AHS's benefit from its premium tax
exemption.

Second, the Superintendent held the Attorney

General to a two-part standard of proof in meeting its burden:
the Superintendent required the Attorney General to produce
"unequivocal evidence" as to the reasons for the premium tax
exemption and to produce "convincing evidence" in support of
the Attorney General's proposed method of allocation.

The

Superintendent committed errors of law in assigning the burden
of proof on this issue to the Attorney General rather than to
AHS and in holding the Attorney General to a higher standard of
proof than is required in rate hearings.
As the Law Court has held on numerous occasions, it is a
reviewing court's responsibility to determine whether an
administrative agency has applied the correct legal standard.
Central Maine Power Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 414
A.2d 1217, 1232 (Me. 1980); New England Telephone & Telegraph
C o ■ v Public Utilities Commission, 448 A.2d 272, 278-79 (Me.
1982).

The Superintendent applied incorrect legal standards in

assigning the burden of proof to the Attorney General and in
holding the Attorney General to an impermissibly high standard
of proof.

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the
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Superintendent and order him to require AHS to allocate its tax
exemption to those lines of insurance which provide coverage to
high risk and economically vulnerable subscribers.
I.

THE SUPERINTENDENT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY ASSIGNING
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.
In his February 25, 1988 Order, the Superintendent

concluded that the Attorney General had failed to carry its
burden of proof on the tax exemption issue.

The

Superintendent's assignment of the burden of proof to the
Attorney General is in error; the burden of proof properly
rests with AHS, the party seeking approval for its requested
rate increase.
The legislative history of 24 M.R.S.A. § 2322, the section
which authorizes the Superintendent to hold a hearing whenever
he has reason to believe that a non-group filing is excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, establishes that the
burden of proof in such a hearing properly rests with the party
filing for a rate increase.
P.L. 1977, c. 493, § 2.

Section 2322 was enacted in 1977.

In its original form, section 2322

contained the following sentence:
The Superintendent shall have the burden of
proof at any hearing concerning a
determination that the rates are excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.
(Emphasis added).
In 1979, the Legislature amended section 2322 deleting the
above quoted sentence.

P.L. 1979, c. 330, § 1.

While the
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Legislature did not debate this change, the Statement of Fact
to the Legislative Document fully explained the Legislature's
purpose in repealing the sentence which allocated the burden of
proof to the Superintendent.

Specifically, the Statement of

Fact provided as follows:
The current statutory language which places
the ’burden of'proof’ upon the
Superintendent of Insurance in establishing
that rates are inadequate, excessive or
unfairly discriminatory is objectionable for
2 major reasons. First, the placing of the
burden of proof on the administrative
decision-maker runs counter to general
principles of administrative law and Maine
law regarding rate-making determinations.
For example, in proceedings before the
Public Utilities Commission the utility
which filed the rate bears the burden of
proof. Second, in the majority of
jurisdictions where rate control authority
exists, the party which requests higher
rates has the burden of justifying such
rates.
L.D. 1566, 109th Legislature, 1979.
The Maine Legislature amended section 2322 so as to ensure ■
that the burden of proof in non-group hearings rested with the
insurer and not with the Superintendent.

In an enacting this

amendment, the Legislature made the procedure in insurance
hearings consistent with the existing procedure at the Public
Utilities Commission which places the burden of proof on the
utility.

Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Utilities

Commission, 405 A.2d 153, 185 (Me. 1979).

The Superintendent
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has erred as a matter of law in assessing the burden of proof
upon the Attorney General and not upon AHS.
II.

THE SUPERINTENDENT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY APPLYING A
STANDARD OF PROOF IN EXCESS OF PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE.
In his February 25, 1988 Order, the Superintendent assigned

two separate standards of proof to the Attorney General in
meeting its burden.

First, the Superintendent held that the

Attorney General was required to present "unequivocal evidence"
as to the reason for the premium tax exemption.

Second, the

Superintendent concluded that the Attorney General was required
to produce "convincing evidence" in support of his proposed
remedial order,

The Superintendent was in error in holding the

Attorney General to such high standards of proof.

Rather, the

Attorney General (or AHS when the burden of proof is placed
correctly) is only required to present evidence to establish a
fact by a preponderance of the evidence .
The Law Court has addressed the issue of the appropriate
standard of proof to be met by a party in an administrative'
rate hearing on one occasion.

In that case, New England

Telephone & Telegraph Co, v. Public Utilities Commission, 444
A.2d 272, 281 (Me. 1982), New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.
(hereinafter referred to as "NET") contended that the Public
Utilities Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "PUC") had
applied an erroneous standard of proof.

Specifically, NET

argued that the PUC had held it to an impermissibly high
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standard of proof:

proof by "clear and convincing evidence."

The Law Court concluded that the hearing examiner (as opposed
to the Commission) had "erroneously" required NET to meet the
clear and convincing standard.

However, the Court noted that

the PUC itself made no reference to the clear and convincing
standard; consequently, the Court concluded that the PUC used
the correct and lesser standard of proof demanded in a rate
hearing.

While the Court's decision does not state what the

lower standard of proof is, the Brief of the PUC to the Law
Court makes it clear that the PUC had applied the standard of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Brief for the

Appellee at 84, New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pubic
Utilities Commission, 444 A.2d 272 (Me. 1982) ("From the -change
between the Examiner's Report and the [Commission's] Order, it
is even clearer than it otherwise would be that the Commission
was not applying a standard of proof stricter than that of
preponderance.")
The Law Court's ruling in New England Telephone & Telegraph
Company v. Public Utilities Commission, that the appropriate
standard of proof in rate cases is proof by a preponderance of
the evidence finds support in general principles of
administrative law.

Specifically, as Davis notes in his

treatise on administrative law, the normal standard of proof
before an administrative tribunal is proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.

3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,
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§ 16.9 at 255 (2nd ed. 1980).

See Collins Securities

Corporation v. Security & Exchange Commission, 562 F.2d 820,
823 (D.C. Cir. 1977); and Sea Island Broadcasting Corp, o£ S.C
v. F.C.C., 627 F .2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

See also E.

Gellhorn and B. Boyer, Administrative Law and Process 197 (2nd
ed. 1981).

The only exception to the use of the preponderance

standard is in those cases in which an administrative tribunal
has the authority to impose serious restrictions on individual
liberty such as deportation.3/

1/In situations in which administrative agencies have authority
to curtail individual liberties, courts have been willing to
apply a higher standard of proof than required by the
prepondernace standard. The United States Supreme Court has
applied the highest civil standard of proof (a standard close
to the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt) —
"clear, unequivocal and convincing — in an immigration
proceeding seeking na order of deportation. Woodby v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 286
(1966). The Supreme Court commented that although a
deportation hearing was not a criminal proceeding, "it does not
syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from this
country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in
negligence case." 385 U.S. 276, 285.
In a well reasoned opinion, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that in an SEC enforcement action for
fraud, in which registration of a broker-dealer was revoked,
the appropriate standard of proof was clear and convincing
evidence. Collins Securities Corp. v. S.E.C., 562 F.2d 820,
824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Court reasoned that such a
standard would "require the SEC to reach a degree of persuasion
much higher than 'mere preponderance of the evidence,1 but
still somewhat less than 'clear, unnequivocal and convincing'
or 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 562 F.2d 820, at 824. The
court also stressed that it was requiring proof by "clear and
convincing" evidence only in fraud cases; "our ruling is
confined to this case involving the typical circumstantial
proof of a fraud case and resulting in a severe sanction of
deprivation of likelihood." 562 F.2d 820, 825, n.32.
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misapplication of the burden and standard of proof
impermissibly affected, and indeed warped, his factual findings
and determinations.

The Superintendent's legal errors, by

denying to Blue Cross and Blue Shield non-group subscribers a
fair and reasonable allocation of the benefits from AHS'
premium tax exemption, have led to the approval by the
Superintendent of excessive rates for non-group coverage.
The Superintendent made three specific factual findings
with respect to the tax exemption issue.

An examination of

each of these findings demonstrates the critical importance of
the Superintendent's misapplication of the burden and standard
of proof.

If the Superintendent had allocated the burden of

proof to AHS and applied the proper standard of proof, he would
have been compelled to reach factual determinations in support
of the positions advocated for by the Attorney General.
The first factual determination made by the Superintendent
with respect to the tax allocation issue was that the Attorney
General had failed to establish any "quantification" of the
benefit to AHS from its exemption from the insurance premium
tax.

January 27, 1988 Decision and Order at 3.

The

Superintendent's finding on this point is hard to fathom since
the Attorney General presented uncontradicted evidence, through
the testimony of Wayne Webster, AHS1s Vice President of
Finance, as to the benefit to AHS from the premium tax
exemption.

Specifically, Wayne'Webster testified that the
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benefit to AHS from its premium tax exemption was 2% of $270
million:
T, 93.

the tax rate times AHS's total subscription income.
While it is difficult to understand how the

Superintendent reached a conclusion, in light of the above
testimony, that the Attorney General had failed to provide
evidence quantifying the tax benefit (unless he meant that Mr.
Webster had failed to testify as to the results of the
application of a 2% tax to $270 million in total subscription
income -—

$5.4 million), it is clear that the Superintendent

factual findings should be different if the burden of proof is
properly assigned to AHS.

AHS submitted absolutely no evidence

to contradict the testimony of Wayne“Webster elicited by the
Attorney General; consequently, AHS failed to satisfy its
burden of proof.
The Superintendent's second factual finding was that the
Attorney General had failed to meet its burden of presenting
"unequivocal evidence that the non-group line is the "raison
d 'etre for" the premium tax exemption.
Decision and Order.

February 25, 1988

The Attorney General presented

uncontradicted evidence that the purpose of the premium tax
exemption was to provide coverage to high risk groups including
non-group or individual subscribers.

Specifically, the

Attorney General elicited testimony, again from Wayne Webster,
Vice President of Finance for AHS, that the purposes underlying
AHS’s state tax exemptions was substantially the same as the

21

reasons underlying the federal tax exemptions for Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Plans.

The Attorney General then submitted the

congressional testimony of the President of the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association, Bernard Tresnowski, which clearly
stated that the purpose of the federal tax exemption for Blue
Cross and Blue Shield was to provide coverage to high risk
persons including "individuals who have no group affiliation."
Attorney General Exhibit No. 1 at 1.

AHS presented no

testimony on the purpose of the premium tax exemption or the
purpose of any other tax exemption applicable to Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Plans and, consequently, AHS failed to satisfy its
burden of proof.
Finally, the Superintendent found that the Attorney General
had failed to present "convincing evidence to justify the
proposed formula for allocation of the benefit" from the
premium tax exemption.

February 25, 1988 Decision and Order.

Here the Superintendent has not only incorrectly assessed the
burden of proof upon the Attorney General and applied an
excessively stringent standard of proof but has applied both
concepts to a remedial order.

24 M.R'.S.A. § 2323 clearly

instructs the Superintendent of Insurance, whenever he
disapproves a rate filing, to "specify the filing we would
approve."

The Superintendent has the responsibility to fashion

his own remedial order; here, however, he erroneously has
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t

assigned to the Attorney General' the burden of justifying a
particular remedial order by "convincing evidence."
CONCLUSION
The Attorney General requests this Court to rule that the
Superintendent committed errors of law in assigning the burden
of proof to the Attorney General on the tax exemption issue and
in holding the Attorney General to a standard of proof
significantly higher than preponderance of the evidence.

This

Court additionally should rule, on the record before it, (1)
that AHS failed to satisfy its burden of proof (AHS, in fact,
failed to submit any evidence at all to contradict the evidence
introduced by the“Attorney General) and (2) that AHS1 insurance
premium tax exemption of $5.4 million should be allocated to
benefit those lines of business which provide coverage to high
risk and economically vulnerable subscribers, namely, non-group
subscribers and Medicare supplement subscribers.

More

specifically, the Attorney General requests this Court to
reverse the decision of the Superintendent and remand the case
for the purpose of permitting the Superintendent to fashion his
own remedial order to implement the Court's ruling that the
premium tax exemption should be allocated to benefit non-group
and other high risk subscribers.
DATED:

June 14, 1989

JAMES E. TIERNEY
Attorney General

STEPHEN ■li'. WESSLER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Consumer & Antitrust Division
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 289-3661

